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1 
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S ACTION PLAN TO 
MODERNIZE EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW: HOW FAR 
SHOULD THE SEC GO IN EXEMPTING EUROPEAN ISSUERS 
FROM COMPLYING WITH THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT? 
 
Kristina A. Sadlak* 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On July 30, 2002, in response to a series of corporate and 
accounting scandals,1 Congress passed the most comprehensive 
securities legislation since the 1930s,2 commonly known as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Act).3 President George W. Bush referred to the 
Act as the “most far-reaching overhaul of the nation’s business 
practices since the Great Depression.”4 The Act affects virtually every 
 
 
* J.D. University of Connecticut School of Law (2006); M.Sc. London School of 
Economics (2003); B.A. New York University (2002). Miss Sadlak is an associate at 
Wiggin and Dana, LLP in New Haven, CT, and is an Adjunct Professor of Economics 
at Manchester Community College, also in Connecticut. She would like to thank Dean 
Emeritus Phillip Blumberg and Professor Patricia McCoy at the University of 
Connecticut School of Law for their assistance with this article. 
1 Most notably the 2002 Enron and WorldCom collapses. See Matthew M. 
Benov, The Equivalence Test and Sarbanes-Oxley: Accommodating Foreign Private 
Issuers and Maintaining the Vitality of U.S. Markets, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW 439, 440. 
“The collapse of WorldCom illustrated that Enron was not simply an anomaly and that 
America needed corporate reform. The sudden and immediate collapse of two 
corporate giants forced the U.S. Congress and the President to respond,” id. at 441.  
2 See William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Concerning 
Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, § II (Sept. 9, 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ 090903tswhd.htm [hereinafter Testimony 
Concerning Implementation]. The Act was passed “[t]o address the widespread 
collapse of investor confidence and the recognition that something had gone seriously 
awry in segments of corporate America,” id. at § II. See also George W. Bush, 
Statement by the President of the United States upon Signing H.R. 3763 (Jul. 30, 
2002), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 543. 
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-
Oxley Act]. 
4 See Mike Allen, Bush Signs Corporate Reforms Into Law; President Says Era 
of “False Profits” is Over, WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at A4.  
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facet of the United States’ capital markets.5 Enacted for the express 
purpose of protecting investors by “improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities 
laws,”6 the Act’s principle objectives are to restore investor confidence 
and to assure the integrity of U.S. markets.7 By passing the Act, 
Congress intended to address the systematic and structural weaknesses 
recently plaguing capital markets, which weaknesses are due mostly to 
ineffective audits and the lack of corporate responsibility.8 
The Act’s provisions require the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC or Agency) to promulgate rules implementing the 
legislation.9 To date, the SEC has made substantial progress toward 
this end.10 The Act’s extensive rules and accompanying regulations 
apply to both domestic and foreign securities issuers that list in the 
United States or file reports with the SEC.11 As a result, the rules 
promulgated by the SEC in accordance with the Act initially subjected 
about 1300 foreign companies to the Act’s new requirements.12 For 
example, the New York Stock Exchange lists 460 non-U.S. companies 
with a global market value of roughly $7.1 trillion.13  
 
 
5 See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at § III. 
6 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3; Bush, supra note 2, at 543. 
7 See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at § III. The major 
objectives of the Act “can be grouped into the following themes: to strengthen and 
restore confidence in the accounting profession; to strengthen enforcement of the 
federal securities laws; to improve the ‘tone at the top’ and executive responsibility; to 
improve disclosure and financial reporting; and to improve the performance of 
‘gatekeepers.’” Id.  
8 JAMES HAMILTON & TED TRAUTMANN, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: LAW 
AND EXPLANATION 13 (2002). 
9 See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at § I. See generally 
Emily Williams, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Is the Investing Public Really Better Off?, 
33 N.M.L. REV. 481 (2003). 
10 See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at § I (stating “we 
have met all of the mandates and challenges set out by the Act, and in record time”). 
11 See id. at § III(F)(1).  
12 See Corinne A. Falencki, Sarbanes-Oxley: Ignoring the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1211 (2004). See also Paula L. 
Green, Overseas Companies to SEC: Don’t Tie Us Down With New Governance 
Rules, GLOBAL FIN., Nov. 2002, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3715/ 
is_200211/ai_n9126258 (last visited Nov. 16, 2006). 
13 New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Directory, http://www.nyse.com/ 
about/listed/listed.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006) (stating the New York Stock 
Exchange is currently home to roughly 2800 companies with a global market value of 
about $21 trillion). 
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However, the SEC must face the reality that the development of 
multinational corporations,14 changing technology, and the removal of 
capital controls worldwide have brought about a truly global securities 
market that may require some exemptions for foreign issuers.15  
At the outset, the SEC did not provide any exemptions for foreign 
issuers.16 Not surprisingly, the Agency received countless objections 
and complaints from foreign securities issuers regarding the 
application of its rules.17 European companies chiefly complain that 
many of the Act’s provisions infringe upon other nations’ sovereignty, 
and as a result, the United States is acting “as a global corporate 
regulator.”18 Foreign issuers also claim that the Act’s stringent 
requirements fail to respect corporate structure norms in their home 
states.19 Strict compliance with the Act will cause European issuers to 
incur significant costs and time commitments. For example, European 
issuers must conform their financial statements to the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), reorganize their Board of 
Directors and audit committees, and comply with potentially 
conflicting corporate governance requirements. In response to 
mounting criticism from European issuers and governments, the SEC 
has finally started to address foreign issuers’ concerns by granting 
 
 
14 Multinational corporations play a key role in both the U.S. and in the world 
economy. Such corporations operate throughout the world, entities incorporate under 
the laws of the countries in which they operate and have multi-tiered structures with a 
plethora of subsidiaries, and are incorporated under the laws of the countries in which 
they operate. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., 5 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS § 1.01 
(2005). 
15 See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, The Internationalization of Capital, in 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM 36 (Herbert Kitschelt et al. 
eds., 1999) (noting that “the internationalization and integration of capital markets has 
been the most significant change in the political economy of the industrialized 
countries over the past three decades”). See also Ethiopis Tafara, Director Office of 
International Affairs, SEC, Testimony Concerning Global Markets, National 
Regulation, and Cooperation Before the House Financial Services Committee (May 
13, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts051304et.htm. 
16 See discussion, infra Part I (discussing the President and the SEC’s intent to 
apply the Act in the same manner to domestic and foreign issuers). 
17 See discussion, infra Part I. 
18 See Falencki, supra note 12, at 1218. 
19 See discussion, infra Part I. See generally Jonathan Shirley, International Law 
and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 501, 525 (2004) (arguing that the Act offends traditional notions of comity). 
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them exemptions to several of the Act’s provisions, which this paper 
discusses in later sections.20  
Just nine months after Congress’ enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, on May 21, 2003, the European Commission of the European 
Union (EC) presented a plan entitled “Modernizing Company Law and 
Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union—A Plan to 
Move Forward” (Plan).21 The Plan seeks to enhance investor 
confidence “in the wake of recent corporate governance scandals”22 
and to foster the worldwide efficiency and competitiveness of 
businesses in the E.U.23 The Plan affects all E.U.-member countries 
and contains a set of legislative24 proposals and recommendations to 
be enacted over three phases through the year 2009.25 The Plan 
addresses many of the same reforms as the Act, but leaves significant 
room for flexibility in order to respect the differences in corporate 
norms and the diverging practices of E.U. Member States.26  
This paper proposes that the SEC should take further steps to 
exempt European issuers from certain of the Act’s provisions because 
they fail to consider the different E.U. corporate practice norms and 
because they infringe on the sovereignty of other nations. 
Additionally, European issuers should be exempt because the EC Plan 
 
 
20 See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at III(F)(I). 
21 Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
European Union—A Plan to Move Forward, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 284 final) 3 
(2003) [hereinafter Modernizing Company Law]. 
22 Modernizing Company Law, supra note 21. The Parmalat scandal is the latest 
in a series of corporate scandals, in which, despite annual losses of 350 to 450 million 
euros from the 1990s through 2001, the company accountings showed positive 
earnings for the years in question. Id. Billions of euro-bonds were issued, despite the 
group’s weak real financial situation of the group. It is speculated that the scandal 
resulted from improperly functioning internal controls within Parmalat’s extensive 
subsidiaries web of subsidiaries, a lack of corporate leadership and governance, and 
audit failures. See Communication From the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on Preventing and Combating Corporate and Financial 
Malpractice, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 611 final) 3 (2004). 
23 See id. 
24 Legislative instruments are defined as requiring “either the adoption of a new 
legislative proposal or the modification of one or several existing legislative 
instruments.” See Modernizing Company Law, supra note 21, at n5. 
25 Press Release, Latham & Watkins LLP, The European Commission Publishes 
its Action Plan on Modernizing European Company Law & Enhancing Corporate 
Governance in Response to Enron, Ahold, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Oct. 24, 2003. 
26 See generally Modernizing Company Law, supra note 21. 
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will likely accomplish the desired goals of the Act.  The SEC could 
create additional limited exemptions without compromising the 
purposes of the Act—to restore investor confidence in the markets and 
to assure the integrity of the U.S. market. These exemptions include: 
1) permitting European issuers to file financial statements with the 
SEC using only International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 2) 
exempting European issuers from audit committee independence 
requirements when the issuer’s home country independence standards 
are the same as the SEC’s, 3) exempting European issuers from CEO 
and CFO certification requirements when the issuer’s home country or 
the EC imposes collective liability on board members, and 4) 
exempting European issuers from Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board) registration and inspection if the 
EC’s Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and 
Committee on Auditing oversight capabilities parallel those of the 
PCAOB. 
In Part I, this paper will briefly discuss the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s 
initial impact on foreign issuers. Part II introduces the EC’s Plan, 
contrasting it with the Act. Part III analyzes the provisions of the Act 
and the accompanying SEC rules affecting European companies, 
contrasting them with equivalent provisions of the EC’s Plan. Part III 
also examines measures that the SEC has already taken to exempt 
European issuers from compliance with the Act, including a discussion 
of what further steps could be taken. Part IV summarizes the proposed 
exemptions. 
 
II. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 
 
The Act’s provisions are far-reaching, making no explicit 
distinction between domestic and foreign issuers. The provisions and 
accompanying rules apply to any issuer who registers securities on an 
American exchange and, more broadly, to any issuer who is required 
to file reports with the SEC.27 Many provisions, such as the executive-
officer-certification requirement, also apply to specific foreign 
corporations not issuing securities on a U.S. exchange. Today, the 
SEC requires foreign issuers with assets greater than $10 million, more 
than 300 U.S. shareholders, and more than 500 total worldwide 
 
 
27 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 3, at § 2. 
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shareholders to register and file reports with the SEC.28 Previously, the 
SEC exempted companies falling within this category from certain 
registration requirements, provided they submit reports containing 
information that the issuer’s home country required to be made 
public.29 
Apparently, the SEC intends to apply all provisions of the Act to 
foreign issuers registering in the United States and filing reports with 
the SEC.30 Yet, the Agency has also stated that it is “prepared to 
consider how [it] can fulfill the mandate of the Act through . . . 
rulemaking and interpretive authority in ways that accommodate the 
 
 
28 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g); Commission Notice: List of Foreign 
Issuers Which Have Submitted Information Under the Exemption Relating to Certain 
Foreign Securities, Release No. 34-39681 (Feb. 19, 1998). See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, 5 FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 211 (2000). See generally 
Stahr & Palenberg, supra note 23. 
29 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12g3-2(b) provides an exemption from 
registration under Section 12(g) with respect to a foreign private issuer that submits to 
the Commission, on a current basis, the material required by the Rule. The 
informational requirements are designed to give investors access to certain 
information so they have the opportunity to inform themselves about the issuer. The 
Rule requires the issuer to provide the Commission with information that it has: 1) 
made or is required to make public pursuant to the law of the country of its domicile or 
the country in which it is incorporated or organized; 2) filed or is required to file with 
a stock exchange on which its securities are traded and that was made public by such 
exchange; and/or, 3) distributed or is required to distribute to its securities holders. 
Commission Notice: List of Foreign Issuers Which Have Submitted Information 
Under the Exemption Relating to Certain Foreign Securities, Securities Act Release 
No. 34-39681 (Feb. 19, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/34-39681.htm (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2006). In December 2005, the SEC announced that it will propose 
new reporting requirements, for example, that a foreign issuer may end its reporting 
requirements if ten percent or less of total shares are held by U.S. investors. Andrew 
Parker, SEC Reform to Ease U.S. Reporting Obligations, FT.COM, Dec. 4, 2005; Press 
Release, SEC Votes to Propose Rules on Tender Offers, Foreign Issuer, 
Deregistration; See also Votes to Adopt Filing Acceleration Changes (Dec. 14, 2005), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-176.htm. 
30 See Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, A Single Capital Market in Europe: Challenges 
for Global Companies, Remarks at the Conference of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of England and Wales (Oct. 10, 2002), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch 589.htm. See also William H. Donaldson, 
Chairman, Testimony Concerning the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Apr. 21, 
2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts042105whd.htm (noting that “the Act 
affects every reporting company, both domestic and foreign, as well as their officers 
and directors and other key participants in our capital markets”). 
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home country requirements and regulatory approaches of the home 
jurisdiction of our foreign registrants and potential registrants.”31   
The Act not only imposes significant costs on foreign issuers, but 
many of its provisions conflict with European norms relating to the 
structure and practices of corporations as discussed in Part III(C)(1) 
and (D)(1). At the outset, numerous European issuers, interest groups, 
and governments widely opposed the Act.32 For example, the Union of 
Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe (UNICE) voiced 
concern over the application of the Act to European issuers.33 
Specifically, UNICE complained that because European issuers 
already face tough audit standards, the extra burdens imposed by the 
Act are unnecessary.34. UNICE also complained that although 
European countries and businesses support standardized corporate 
governance standards, these standards are nevertheless a product of the 
legal and economic cultures prevailing in each country.35  
Likewise, European issuers object to the Act because compliance 
with the Act’s provisions imposes burdensome costs. In some 
instances requires issuers to comply with conflicting regulations.36 
German entities decried the incompatibility of the Act’s corporate 
governance provisions with German corporate governance laws.37 The 
European Commission’s Director General, Alexander Schaub, even 
requested that the SEC exempt all E.U. companies and auditors from 
the Act’s corporate governance reform provisions.38 
 
 
31 Id. 
32 See A.M. Best Company, Inc., Sarbanes-Oxley Adds Uncertainty to European 
View of U.S. Markets, BESTWIRE, Mar. 10, 2003 (stating “there’s a concern in the 
European Union about a lack of deference to the European regulatory environment” 
and “the idea that the U.S. approach to corporate governance and financial reporting is 
too rigid and complex is fairly common in Europe”). 
33 See Maria Camilla Cardilli, LLM Perspectives: Regulation Without Borders: 
The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on European Companies, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 785, 
791 (2004). 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. at 791-92. 
37 Green, supra note 12. 
38 Letter from Alexander Schaub, Director General of the European 
Commission, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Feb. 18, 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/ proposed/s70203/aschaub1.htm. Alexander Schaub stated in 
full:  
We request full recognition of equivalence of EU corporate 
governance system …. The SEC should be aware that EU 
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Prior to the Act, the SEC respected the different laws under which 
foreign issuers were incorporated. Consequently, the SEC did not 
require that foreign issuers in the U.S. capital markets comply with 
provisions relating to registration and disclosure.39 Instead, the SEC 
allowed foreign companies to prepare their financial statements 
according to U.S. GAAP, or some other adequate alternative 
accounting standard.40 As with the Act, companies preparing financial 
statements according to standards other than U.S. GAAP were 
required to include a reconciliation of material variations between the 
two standards.41 Before the Act, however, the SEC only required a 
signature on behalf of the company. Now, the Act requires a specific 
corporate officer to verify such reconciliations.42 Furthermore, prior to 
the Act, the SEC did not subject foreign issuers to requirements 
regarding internal control procedures. 43 It noted that doing so “may be 
inconsistent with the laws or practices of the foreign private issuers’ 
home jurisdiction and stock exchange requirements.”44  
 
 
companies and auditors are already subject to longstanding, well-
developed member state corporate governance requirements. These 
are tailored to their specific legal environments and are in their 
different ways as effective and efficient at providing investor 
protection as U.S. rules. Additional requirements of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act applied to EU companies and auditors would place on 
them an unnecessary additional layer of requirements—taken from 
a completely different (U.S.) corporate governance environment. 
We fail to see why EU companies and auditors should be 
overburdened with such duplicative requirements compared to 
their U.S. counterparts. . . .Bearing this in mind, the SEC should 
recognize the equivalence of EU corporate governance systems 
and thus fully exempt not only EU lawyers but also EU companies 
and auditors from the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, also with 
regard to audit committee requirements. 
39 See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a–z-3 (2002); Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a–ff (2002). 
40 See id.  
41 See id.  
42 See id. 
43 See, e.g., SEC, Proposed Rule: Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ 
Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,877, 41,882 (June 20, 2002), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-46079.htm. 
44 See id. See also Falencki, supra note 12, at 1216 (noting that “despite the 
longstanding adherence to the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. 
regulatory frameworks, the SEC felt unable to ignore the language of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 which calls for application to all companies that list stock on the 
U.S. capital markets”). 
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In response to the criticism of foreign government entities and 
corporations, the SEC has created various narrow exemptions for 
foreign entities. The SEC also extended compliance deadlines for 
foreign issuers. However, the SEC continues to apply the Act’s 
provisions to European corporations issuing securities on the U.S. 
market or filing reports with the SEC. 
 
III. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S PLAN 
 
On May 21, 2003, the European Commission (EC) published an 
action plan entitled, “Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing 
Corporate Governance in the EU” (the Plan).45 The Plan implements 
new measures that strengthen shareholders’ rights, protect third 
parties, and foster business efficiency and competitiveness.46 By 
implementing these reforms, the EC respects the diversity of each 
member state’s response to the problems addressed by the Act.47 
Although the EC adopted the Plan only nine months after the adoption 
of the Act, the Commission emphasized that: 
  
[The Plan] should help shape international regulatory 
developments. The EU must define its own European 
corporate governance approach, tailored to its own 
cultural and business traditions. Indeed, this is an 
opportunity for the Union to strengthen its influence 
in the world with good, sensible corporate governance 
rules. Corporate governance is indeed an area where 
standards are increasingly being set at international 
level, as evidenced by the recent developments 
observed in the United States. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, adopted on 30 July 2002 in the wave of a series 
of scandals, delivered a rapid response. The Act 
unfortunately creates a series of problems due to its 
outreach efforts on European companies and auditors, 
and the Commission is engaged in an intense 
regulatory dialogue with a view to negotiating 
acceptable solutions with the U.S. authorities (in 
particular the Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 
 
45 Latham & Watkins LLP, supra note 25.  
46 Modernizing Company Law, supra note 21, at 5. 
47 Id. 
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In many areas, the EU shares the same broad 
objectives and principles of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and in some areas, robust, equivalent regulatory 
approaches already exist in the EU. In other areas, 
new initiatives are necessary. Earning the right to be 
recognized as at least “equivalent” alongside other 
national and international rules is a legitimate end in 
itself.48 
 
The Plan set forth short, medium, and long-term objectives49 
designed to affect reform in the areas of corporate governance, 
shareholders’ rights, and transparency.50 The EC intended to 
accomplish its short-term objectives between 2003–2006, its medium-
term objectives between 2006–2009, and its long-term objectives after 
2009.51 As of June 2005, the Commission had purportedly addressed 
all actions originally identified as short-term objectives in the Plan.52 
The EC’s approach integrated several other prior initiatives as part 
of the Plan’s overall objective. The EC previously set forth “The 
Financial Reporting Strategy of 2002,” which aimed to improve 
financial reporting by adopting a common set of accounting 
standards.”53 Charlie McCreevy, the European Commissioner for 
Internal Market and Services, has stressed that the Plan “must be 
focused and based on a solid assessment of actual needs of market 
players and investors [and the Plan’s] potential impact . . . must also 
be subject to careful and thorough assessment.”54 To this end, the EC 
“will seek to support corporate development and foster growth in an 
 
 
48 Id. 
49 See id. at Appendix A. 
50 See id. at 2. The Plan looks specifically at the areas of capital maintenance and 
alteration, groups and pyramids, corporate restructuring and mobility, the European 
private company, and enhancing the transparency of for national legal forms of 
enterprise. 
51 See id. at Appendix A. 
52 Charlie McCreevy, European Comm’r for Internal Mkt. and Servs., The 
European Corporate Governance Action Plan: Setting Priorities, Second European 
Corporate Governance Conference, Luxembourg (June 28, 2005), transcript available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mccreevy/allspeeches_en.htm. 
53 See Modernizing Company Law, supra note 21, at 3–4. See also “The 
Communication on the priorities for the statutory audit in the EU.” These initiatives 
are not explicitly part of the Plan, but they seek to solve the same problems as the U.S. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act through an integrated approach. See id. 
54 McCreevy, supra note 52. 
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environment of trust and confidence in corporations and markets 
[because] businesses and investors alike need appropriate and efficient 
regulation, not over-regulation, but better regulation.”55  
In several aspects of its Plan, particularly in its non-legislative 
proposals, the EC follows its Member States’ traditional “comply or 
explain” approach.56 Under this approach, companies may choose to 
disclose whether they comply with the applicable code,57 and then they 
must explain any material departures from it.58 The Plan also uses both 
legislative instruments and broad recommendations, focusing on 
flexibility by accommodating the different approaches of its member 
countries. In addition, the EC approach phases in requirements over 
several years. In contrast, the SEC approach implements the Act’s 
rigid set of rules and reforms rapidly and with universal application, 
only considering the difference in issuers’ home countries in a post-
hoc fashion.59 
 
IV. THE MAJOR REFORMS 
 
This section examines the Act’s major reforms and the SEC’s 
rules, with an emphasis on their impacts on European companies. In 
addition, this section analyzes the pertinent provisions of the EC’s 
Plan and any exemptions the SEC has already implemented. Finally, 
each section discusses further steps the SEC should take towards 
exempting European issuers from complying with the Act. The major 
reforms of both the Act and the Plan relate to A) accounting standards 
and financial reporting disclosures, B) accounting oversight, C) 
auditor independence, and D) corporate governance. Each reform, its 
impact on European companies, its counterpart in the EC Plan, and 
any relevant SEC exemptions for European issuers are discussed in 
turn below. 
 
 
 
55 Id. 
56 See Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC on the role of non-executive 
or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the 
(supervisory) board, 2005 O.J. (L 52) 4 [hereinafter 2005 O.J. (L 52)]. “This approach 
enables companies to reflect sector- and enterprise-specific requirements, and the 
markets to assess the explanations and justifications provided. Id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id.  
59 See discussion, infra Part III(A)–(D). 
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A. Accounting Standards and Financial Reporting Disclosures 
 
Some of the most important reforms affecting investor confidence 
in publicly traded companies are those relating to accounting standards 
and financial reporting disclosures. Both the Act and the EC’s Plan 
incorporate strict disclosure requirements.60 To ease tensions and help 
facilitate a more global economy, the United States should bring its 
accounting practices in line with European and international standards 
by adopting IFRS or a similar principles-based accounting standard. 
  
1. The Act 
 
The Act imposes various corporate disclosure requirements in the 
areas of accounting and financial reporting. Section 401 of the Act 
requires that an issuer disclose “all material correcting adjustments 
that have been identified by a registered public accounting firm”61 in 
accordance with GAAP and SEC rules. An issuer must also disclose: 
 
[a]ll material off-balance sheet transactions, 
arrangements, obligations (including contingent 
obligations), and other relationships of the issuer with 
unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may 
have a material current or future effect on financial 
condition, changes in financial condition, results of 
operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, capital 
resources, or significant components of revenue or 
expenses.62 
 
The rules adopted by the SEC pursuant to Section 401 are equally 
applicable to both domestic and foreign issuers.63 Foreign issuers, 
whose primary financial statements are prepared in accordance with 
non-GAAP standards, must reconcile the non-GAAP standards to the 
U.S. GAAP, in addition to identifying any differences between the 
 
 
60 Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at III(E). 
61 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 401. See generally Final Rule: 
Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet 
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Release No. 33-8182 (Apr. 7, 
2003) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8182]. 
62 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 401. 
63 See Release No. 33-8182, supra note 63. 
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foreign standard and U.S. GAAP “if it would be necessary for an 
understanding of the financial statements as a whole.”64  
Regulation G, adopted in accordance with Section 341, applies 
when a company uses a non-GAAP standard.65 Regulation G requires 
a “presentation of the most directly comparable financial measure 
calculated and presented in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles.”66 Any issuer, including foreign issuers, 
disclosing non-GAAP financial measures must present such 
information in a true and accurate manner that does not omit material 
facts and must reconcile the non-GAAP financial standard with 
GAAP.67 Thus, requiring foreign issuers to comply with Regulation G 
imposes significant costs on issuers preparing financial statements 
using non-GAAP standards. 
  
2. The EC’s Plan 
 
In June 2000, the EC adopted the EC Financial Reporting 
Strategy, requiring all listed E.U. companies to prepare their 
consolidated accounts in accordance with IFRS, starting January 1, 
2005.68 In light of the securities market globalization, the EC 
recognized the desire to develop a “single, efficient, and competitive 
EU securities market.”69 The EC’s objective in adopting IFRS is to 
“accelerate the completion of a single securities market” and “to 
enhance comparability of financial statements.”70 After carefully 
 
 
64 Id. (noting that “We believe that the references to U.S. GAAP in the definition 
best achieve the appropriate scope of arrangements that require more transparent 
disclosure, regardless of any particular accounting treatment”). 
65 See Final Rule: Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 
Release No. 33-8176; 34-47226; FR-65; FILE NO. S7-43-02 (Mar. 28, 2003) 
[hereinafter Release No. 33-8176]. 
66 SEC, 17 C.F.R. 244.100(a)(1) (2003). See also Release No. 33-8176, supra 
note 67. 
67 See 17 C.F.R. 244.100(b). See also Release No. 33-8176, supra note 67; 
Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at III(E)(3). 
68 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament, EU Financial Reporting Strategy: the Way Forward 
EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 359 final) 2 (2000) [hereinafter EU Financial Reporting 
Strategy]. 
69 Id. at 2–3 (noting that “Member States’ securities markets are in a period of 
dramatic change and increasing consolidation, driven by new technologies, 
globalization and the effect of the Euro”). 
70 Id. at 2. 
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considering the benefits of and differences between the IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP, the EC elected to adopt IFRS.71 Regarding the differences 
between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, the EC noted: 
 
Already [IFRS] provides a comprehensive and 
conceptually robust set of standards for financial 
reporting that should serve the needs of the 
international business community. [IFRS] also has the 
distinct advantage of being drawn up with an 
international perspective, rather than being tailored to 
the U.S. environment. U.S. GAAP, on the other hand, 
is voluminous and is based on very detailed rules and 
interpretations. Considerable education and training is 
necessary in order to use its standards. In the U.S. its 
effective application stems largely from the strong 
regulatory and enforcement powers exercised by the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The 
European Union does not, of course, have influence 
on the elaboration of U.S. GAAP.72 
 
The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) 
enforces IFRS.73 Although the IFRS transition costs European 
companies significant outlay, Charlie McCreevy, the European 
Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, views this transition 
as a success, because “given the success of the Euro and the growing 
liquidity of E.U. capital markets, access to U.S. capital is no longer as 
essential for many SEC-registrants as it once was. Rather the question 
has become how to get out of the U.S. capital market!”74  
  
3. The SEC’s exemptions for European issuers 
 
A foreign issuer is only exempt from complying with Regulation 
G reconciliation requirements if: 
 
(1) the securities of the registrant are listed or quoted 
on a securities exchange or inter-dealer quotation 
 
 
71 See id. at 5–6. 
72 Id. at 6. 
73 See discussion, infra Part III(B)(2). 
74 Id. 
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system outside the United States; (2) the non-GAAP 
financial measure is not derived from or based on a 
measure calculated and presented in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles in the United 
States; and (3) the disclosure is made by or on behalf 
of the registrant outside the United States, or is 
included in a written communication that is released 
by or on behalf of the registrant outside the United 
States.75 
 
Foreign issuers remain exempt under Regulation G even if the 
non-GAAP communications intended for a foreign market happen to 
reach the United States.76 The SEC implemented Regulation G 
because it “did not want to interfere with the regular practices 
governing how foreign companies communicated with investors in 
non-U.S. markets.”77  
In response to the European Union’s costly conversion to IFRS, 
the SEC recently adopted a rule permitting European issuers using 
IFRS for the first time78 to reconcile their financial statements to U.S. 
GAAP standards over two years, as opposed to three years, as required 
by Regulation G.79 This minor change to the U.S. GAAP 
reconciliation requirement still subjects European firms to costs 
beyond those necessary to achieve the Act’s goals. The EC, however, 
expects to reach an agreement with the SEC, which would commit the 
SEC to remove the U.S. GAAP reconciliation requirement as early as 
2007, but no later than 2009.80 
Furthermore, under the Act, the SEC undertook a project entitled 
“Study and Report on Adopting Principles-Based Accounting” to 
determine whether the United States should transition from GAAP to 
an international accounting standard, such as IFRS.81 IFRS is a 
 
 
75 17 C.F.R. 244.100(c). 
76 See William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Speech by SEC Chairman: U.S. Capital 
Markets in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley World: Why Our Markets Should Matter to 
Foreign Issuers (Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch012505whd.htm. 
77 Id. 
78 Before January 1, 2007. See Final Rule: First-Time Application of 
International Financial Reporting Standards, Release Nos. 33-8567, 34-51535 (May 
20, 2005) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8567].  
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 108(d)(1). 
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principles-based accounting method, whereas GAAP is rules-based.82 
The study, which the SEC completed in 2003, concluded that the 
United States should adopt an accounting standard similar to 
international accounting standards, such as IFRS, because “the 
adoption of objectives-oriented principles-based accounting standards 
in the United States would be consistent with the vision of reform that 
was the basis for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”83  
Nevertheless, the United States has not followed the E.U.’s 
example of using IFRS, which has created a roadblock for European 
issuers registering with the SEC.84 European issuers are already 
undergoing the difficult transition of adopting IFRS in place of their 
home-country accounting standards. The difficulty of this transition is 
only exacerbated by the fact that these same European issuers must 
also reconcile IFRS with U.S. GAAP; instead of imposing this 
reconciliation requirement on European issuers, the SEC should permit 
them to file financial statements with the SEC using only IFRS. Doing 
so would greatly reduce costs imposed upon the European issuers, 
while still accomplishing the investor protection objectives of the 
Act.85 Additionally, the SEC should consider adopting IFRS, or a 
similar principle-based accounting standard, in order to bring U.S. 
accounting practices in line with European and international standards. 
Such a transition may ultimately prove possible if, as discussed 
previously, the SEC removes the U.S. GAAP reconciliation 
requirement by 2009.86 
 
 
82 See Anupama J. Naidu, Comment, Was its Bite Worse than its Bark? The 
Costs Sarbanes-Oxley Imposes on German Issuers May Translate Into Costs to the 
United States, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 271, 287–88 (2004). 
83 SEC, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on 
the Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based 
Accounting System (July 25, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
principlesbasedstand.htm. 
84 For more information regarding the work of the FASB and IASB on the 
convergence of a global accounting standard see http://www.fasb.org/intl/ 
convergence_iasb.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2006). 
85 DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, 3 ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS, 
2005 SUPPLEMENT 22 (2005). In determining how a particular transaction should be 
treated, the IFRS relies on broad principles, as opposed to U.S. GAAP’s specific rules 
and on professional judgment. 
86 See Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and 
Services, EC Strategy on Financial Reporting: Progress on Convergence and 
Consistency (Dec. 1, 2005), transcript available at http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
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B. Accounting Oversight 
 
In addition to the changes to accounting standards and financial 
reporting disclosures, the Act has also made significant changes to 
accounting oversight. The accounting industry has become a global 
business,87 and as a result, accounting firms have consolidated and 
expanded their worldwide audit services.88 Prior to the Act, the 
accounting profession more or less regulated itself, setting its own 
accounting standards and conducting private disciplinary measures.89 
In the United States, the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
made rules, set accounting standards, and conducted independent 
tribunals when complaints arose.90 The FASB’s decisions were 
incorporated into federal law and followed by the SEC.91  
As described below, the Act changed auditing practices 
significantly by tightening controls, federalizing the accounting 
industry, and creating a new oversight board. The EC’s system 
parallels the situation in the United States prior to the new 
modifications, but it too will change as the EC implements the Plan. If 
the EC strengthens the oversight capabilities of the CESR and the 
Committee on Auditing so that they are more in line with the United 
States new oversight board’s functions, then the SEC should consider 
exempting European issuers from registration and inspection by the 
U.S. oversight board. 
 
 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/750&format=HTML&aged=0& 
language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
87 SEC, Revision of Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 76,008, 76,013 (Dec. 5, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
7919.htm. 
88 See id. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 9, at 484–85. 
89 See HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 8, at 13–14.  
90 Tracy N. Tucker, International Accounting Standards in the Wake of Enron 
Essay: It Really is Just Trying to Help: The History of FASB and its Role in Modern 
Accounting Practices, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1023 (2003). “The FASB was 
launched amid general optimism and enthusiasm. It was literally unique in almost 
every respect, most notably in the fact that it was a rule-making body financed and 
operated entirely in the private sector but whose decisions would be backed by federal 
law and a powerful federal regulatory agency. The authority of the FASB derives from 
Congress in the Securities Acts of the early 1930s and comes through the SEC and the 
trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation.” Id. at 1026–27 (internal quotations 
omitted). See generally Facts About FASB, FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts/ (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2006). 
91 See id. The FASB still exists, and its accounting standards have been adopted 
by the PCAOB.   
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 1. The Act 
 
One of the Act’s major reforms was the federalization of the 
accounting industry and regulation by the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board).92 The PCAOB 
oversees auditors of public companies,93 establishes ethics and quality 
control standards for auditors,94 and inspects public accounting firms.95 
Although the PCAOB is responsible to regulate the accounting 
industry, it may adopt rules and standards established by professional 
private accounting organizations.96 The PCAOB also investigates and 
charges public consulting firms for violations of rules relating to 
audits, imposing sanctions for such violations.97 The SEC appoints 
PCAOB members, approves PCAOB rules and professional standards, 
approves the annual budget and support fees, acts as an appellate 
authority for PCAOB disputes relating to PCAOB inspection reports, 
and oversees PCAOB operations.98 
All audit firms, including foreign audit firms “providing 
significant audit services for issuers listed in the U.S.,”99 must register 
with, and be inspected by, the PCAOB.100 In fact, any foreign auditing 
firm that prepares or furnishes an audit report concerning an issuer is 
subject to the Act and SEC rules “in the same manner and to the same 
extent” as a domestic accounting firm.101 This requirement treats 
foreign accounting firms the same as domestic accounting firms, thus 
eliminating any incentive for either domestic or foreign companies to 
use foreign accounting firms to circumvent the Act.102 Exempting 
 
 
92 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at §§ 101–09. 
93 Id. § 101(a). 
94 Id. § 103. 
95 Id. § 104. 
96 Id. § 103(a)(3). 
97 Id. §101(c). 
98 Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at III(A)(1).  
99 Donaldson, supra note 76. 
100 See id. 
101 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 106(a)(1). However, registration 
with the board itself will not subject a foreign accounting firm to state or federal court 
jurisdiction other than with regard to controversies between those firms and the 
PCAOB. See id. 
102 See HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 8, at 26. 
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foreign accounting firms from complying with the Act would create “a 
significant loophole in the protection offered U.S. investors.”103 
 
2. The Plan 
 
Established in 2001 by the EC, the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) is charged with overseeing the European 
accounting industry and enforcing the IFRS.104 The CESR’s official 
role is to improve coordination among European Securities Regulators 
and to advise the EC, especially when it prepares draft measures for 
the securities field.105 CESR, however, does not function as a 
regulatory agency like the PCAOB. 
The EC also established an additional oversight committee, the 
E.U. Committee on Auditing, in May 1998.106 The committee meets 
two or three times a year and is composed of statutory audit regulators 
from the fifteen Member States, members from the three countries of 
the European Economic Area, representatives of the audit profession, 
as well as the internal auditors and European representatives of the 
large audit firms.107 This committee’s overall objective is to develop a 
universal view on statutory audits at the E.U. level, especially for 
matters not covered by existing E.U. legislation.108  
The agenda priorities for the Committee on Auditing are to 
“review . . . the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) as a 
benchmark for E.U. audit requirements, examine the external quality 
assurance systems for statutory audit, develop minimum requirements 
to be applied throughout the single market, and examine a set of core 
principles on independence and audit objectivity developed by the 
 
 
103 S. Rep. 107–205 (July 3, 2002), p. 11. 
104 European Commission, The International Accounting Standards, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/ias_en.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). 
105 See Commission Decision establishing the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 1. 
106 See Commission Communication, The Statutory audit in the European Union: 
the way forward, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 286 final) (2003). 
107 European Commission, Committees and Groups on Auditing, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/committee/index_ en.htm (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2006). 
108 See id. (noting that in the context of a single E.U. capital market audited 
financial information should have the same level of credibility throughout the E.U., 
thus facilitating and stimulating cross border investments). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 3 
20 
Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE).”109 Through the 
Committee on Auditing, the EC plans to maintain a system of 
“monitored self-regulation” and to propose legislation only when 
necessary.110 The EC’s system closely parallels that of the United 
States prior to the creation of the PCAOB: the industry regulatory 
body functions independently from the government in developing 
minimum requirements and coordinating EC accounting and auditing 
practices, with only occasional governmental legislative intervention.  
  
3. The SEC exemptions for European issuers 
 
PCAOB may determine whether it will subject or exempt certain 
accounting firms from compliance with the Act. PCAOB may require 
the compliance of foreign firms if the Board determines that the firms 
play such significant roles in the preparation of audit reports that they 
should be treated the same as United States firms preparing audit 
reports.111 Conversely, the SEC and PCAOB—subject to SEC 
approval—may also exempt a foreign accounting firm from any 
provision of the Act, the SEC rules, or the PCAOB’s rules if it is 
necessary or appropriate in light of public interest.112  
In response to conflicts with foreign privacy laws and blocking 
statutes, the PCAOB has made changes in the information required 
from foreign accounting firms during the registration process.113 A 
foreign accounting firm may now withhold information from its 
application for registration when submitting such information if it 
would violate foreign law.114 When withholding information, 
applicants must submit a legal opinion stating that submitting the 
information would violate foreign laws.115 The justifications for 
withholding information under foreign laws generally relate to data 
 
 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 106(a)(2). 
112 See id. at § 106(c). 
113 See id. See also Final Rule: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; 
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rules Relating to Registration System, Release No. 34-
47990 (Jun. 5, 2003). 
114 Id. 
115 Id.  
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protection, employee privacy, client confidentiality, bank secrecy, and 
national security.116 
Regardless of foreign privacy laws, however, if a foreign 
accounting firm issues an opinion or otherwise performs material 
services upon which a registered public accounting firm relies in 
issuing all or part of an audit report, the Act deems that foreign 
accounting firm to have consented to produce its audit work papers for 
the PCAOB or the SEC in connection with an investigation, and to be 
subject to United States judicial jurisdiction for enforcement of any 
request to produce such papers.117 Domestic accounting firms that rely 
on a foreign firm’s work receive the same treatment, and the SEC 
considers the domestic accounting firm to have received the foreign 
firm’s consent to such production as a condition of its reliance on the 
foreign firm’s opinion.118  
While the SEC could consider exempting European issuers from 
registration and inspection by the PCAOB, exemptions should not be 
necessary because it is unlikely the EC will strengthen the European 
accounting oversight capabilities. Instead, the EC has stated that it will 
maintain a system of self-regulation in the accounting industry. The 
EC’s system of “monitored self-regulation” parallels the United 
States’ situation prior to the creation of the PCAOB. Even without an 
equivalent European oversight body in place, the SEC’s current rule 
permitting foreign accounting firms to omit information conflicting 
with non-U.S. laws respects foreign laws. The PCAOB’s reach 
concerning registration requirements and information privacy is 
therefore adequately limited. 
  
C. Auditor Independence 
 
Another of the Act’s important reforms increases enforcement of 
auditor independence. Since reliable information regarding a business’ 
financial health is central to investors’ decisions, third-party auditors 
are charged with independently examining a corporation’s financial 
statements119 and ultimately expressing an opinion about the accuracy 
 
 
116 Letter from Ernst & Young, LLP, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, SEC (July 2, 
2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/pcaob 200303/ernstyoung070203.htm. 
117 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 106(b). 
118 See id. at § 106(b)(2). 
119 See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 90, at 8–9. 
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of the financial statements.120 Requiring the auditor’s independence 
will “enhance the integrity of the audit process and the reliability of 
audit reports on issuers’ financial statements.”121  
  
1. The Act 
 
Overall, the Act requires increased auditor independence by 
focusing on auditors and audit committees, as well as the executives 
and directors of public companies.122 The Act expands the list of non-
audit services that an auditor is prohibited from providing to an 
issuer,123 requires an issuer’s audit committee to pre-approve all audit 
and non-audit services provided to the issuer by the auditor,124 and 
requires that partners on the audit team for a particular company rotate 
every five years.125 To avoid conflicts of interest: 
 
It shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting 
firm to perform for an issuer any audit service 
required by this title, if a chief executive officer, 
controller, chief financial officer, chief accounting 
officer, or any person serving in an equivalent position 
for the issuer, was employed by that registered 
independent public accounting firm and participated 
 
 
120 See id. 
121 Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at III(A). The Act 
“establishes a comprehensive framework to modernize and reform the oversight of 
public company auditing, improve quality and transparency in financial reporting by 
those companies, and strengthen the independence of auditors. It promotes 
competition among service providers, enhances accurate investor decision-making 
throughout the capital markets, and seeks to correct shortcomings that have threatened 
the reputation of those markets for integrity.” HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 8, 
at 13. 
122 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 201–09. 
123 Id. at § 201. The following services are listed as falling outside the scope of 
an auditor’s practice: “1) bookkeeping…; 2) financial information systems design and 
implementation; 3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness options, or contribution-in-
kind reports; 4) actuarial services; 5) internal audit outsourcing services; 6) 
management functions or human resources; 7) broker or dealer, investment advisor, or 
investment banking services; 8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the 
audit; and 9) any other service that the PCAOB determines, by regulation, is 
impermissible.” Id. 
124 Id. at § 202. 
125 Id. at § 203. 
WINTER 2006 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 
23 
in any capacity in the audit of that issuer during the 1-
year period preceding the date of the initiation of the 
audit.126  
 
Other provisions require the auditor to report certain matters to the 
issuer’s audit committee and require disclosing to investors certain 
information relating to audit and non-audit services the auditor 
provides as well as information on fees paid to the auditor.127  
Section 301 of the Act and the accompanying SEC rules set forth 
the independence requirements for members of an issuer’s audit 
committee.128 All audit committee members must be independent. The 
audit committee must be directly responsible for the appointment, 
compensation, retention, and oversight of a company’s outside 
auditors; and outside auditors must report directly to the audit 
committee.129 No member of an audit committee may accept a 
consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer other 
than in their capacity as a member of the audit committee, board of 
directors or other board committee.130 This requirement is known as 
the “compensation prong.”131  
Further, an audit committee member cannot be an “affiliate” of the 
issuer or of a subsidiary of the issuer, other than in that affiliate’s 
capacity as member of the audit committee or director.132 Specifically, 
the Act defines an “affiliate” as “a person that directly or indirectly 
through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is 
under common control with, the person specified.”133 The SEC added 
 
 
126 Id. at § 206. 
127 Id. at §§ 201–09. See also Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 
2, at § III(A)(2). 
128 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 301; Standards Relating to Listed 
Companies Audit Committees, Release No. 33-8220, 79 SEC Docket 2876 (Apr. 9, 
2003) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8220]. The rules direct the nation’s exchanges to 
prohibit any company that is not in compliance with the Section 301 audit committee 
requirements established by Section 301 from listing on such exchange. See 
Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at § III(F)(1). These rules 
prevent auditors from controlling a company’s financial reporting system by first 
designing the internal audit system, and then purporting to offer an unbiased external 
audit. See HAMILTON & TRAUTMANN, supra note 8, at 15. 
129 See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 2, at § III(F)(1). 
130 Release No. 33-8220.; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 301(3)(B)(i). 
131 See Release No. 33-8220, supra note 128. 
132 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3, at § 301(3)(B)(ii). 
133 Release No. 33-8220, supra note 128; 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2006). 
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a safe harbor to this provision, wherein “a person who is not an 
executive officer or a shareholder owning ten percent or more of any 
class of voting equity securities of a specified person will be deemed 
not to control such specified person.”134 Where an audit committee 
member is a significant shareholder, owning ten percent or more of the 
entity’s shares, such member’s decisions regarding appointment, 
retention, and oversight of the outside auditor may be tainted by 
financial interests in the entity. For example, the member would have a 
financial interest in portraying the corporation’s financial situation 
positively and would therefore likely seek to appoint an auditor who 
would provide a favorable opinion of the company’s financial 
statements. 
In American corporations, compliance with such requirements is 
easy to ascertain, albeit costly, because American publicly traded 
corporations are typically owned by millions of shareholders.135 Most 
American publicly traded corporations have widely dispersed 
ownership, and no one group of shareholders exercises ultimate 
control over selecting directors.136 Thus, separation of ownership and 
control characterizes American corporations.137  
Applying the Act’s independence requirements to European 
corporations, however, is more than just costly. Although the 
 
 
134 Release No. 33-8220, supra note 128. 
135 See Benjamin Mojuye, French Corporate Governance in the New 
Millennium: Who Watches the Board in Corporate France?, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 73, 
74 (2000) (discussing how U.S. public corporations typically divide shares among 
millions of individuals, who can sell their stocks quickly if and when they become 
dissatisfied with the corporation’s management). 
136 See id. The directors manage the corporation and the control of the 
corporation is separated from its ownership. Shareholders own the corporation—by 
virtue of their stock ownership interest—and they elect a board of directors to exercise 
control over the corporation. The directors then choose the officers to run the business, 
subject to their supervision. See id. 
137 ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE 
LAW 85 (1999) (describing how institutional investors also play a large role in 
American investing strategy, accounting for approximately seventy percent of all 
trading activity in the U.S.); see Ben McClure, Institutional Investors and 
Fundamentals: What’s the Link?, INVESTOPEDIA, Oct. 15, 2005, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental/03/101503.asp. Institutional 
investors consist of mutual funds, pension funds, banks and other large financial 
institutions. These institutional investors act as intermediaries for individuals investing 
their money in securities. These types of investment entities are often considered 
“smart money” because, as professional traders and stock market watchers, they have 
more knowledge and expertise than average investors. See id. 
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fundamental common law and civil law concepts of the corporation 
rest on the same medieval roots,138 European corporation ownership 
structures are fundamentally different from their U.S. counterparts.139 
In Europe, a corporation’s shareholders often have a significant stake 
in the company’s equity.140 For example, in France the dominant 
shareholder is usually a family, company, or the State.141 In Germany, 
a “universal bank” typically owns a large share of the corporation,142 
which makes it unlikely that board members and audit committee 
members in these corporations will meet the safe harbor’s ten percent 
maximum ownership requirement. Moreover, through shared 
ownership, European governments have historically exercised “special 
rights” to retain control of privatized corporations.143 Such special 
rights permit the government to veto or hinder changes in the 
enterprise’s ownership structure or its management.144 Such 
circumstances greatly limit an investor’s right to participate in the 
corporation’s management.145 Examining German and French board of 
director and audit committee practices reveals the difficulties posed by 
the Act’s independence requirement.  
 
 
138 See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, 3 LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 14–
16 (1983) (discussing how the concept of the corporate form in both civil law and 
common law societies developed out of ancient medieval and Roman law and how 
such concepts developed into canon law in the early thirteenth century, followed by 
merchant law, which served as the model for the modern civil and common law 
corporations);  See also PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO 
CORPORATION LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 3–4 (1993) 
(noting that despite disagreement over the extent that Roman law accepted concepts of 
corporations, modern corporate law has distinct direct or indirect roots in Roman law). 
139 But, in both the U.S. and in European civil law countries, such as Germany 
and France, the corporation itself is a separate legal entity separate from its 
shareholders. See Franck Chantayan, An Examination of American and German 
Corporate Law Norms, 16 St. John’s J. Legal Comment 431, 435 (2002); Naidu, supra 
note 82, at 280. 
140 Sophie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United 
States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, in The Harvard John M. Olin 
Discussion Paper Series, at 1 (Discussion Paper No. 490, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=623286. 
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Union–A Decade Full of Developments 4 (Comm’n Staff Working Document, July 22, 
2005). 
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 a. German practice. While German and U.S. corporate practices 
share common traits, some differences between them make it difficult 
for German companies to comply with the Act’s independence 
requirement. The German corporation most similar to an American 
publicly traded corporation is the Aktiengesellschaft (AG).146 Unlike a 
U.S. corporation, however, the AG has a two-tiered board structure 
consisting of a managing board and a supervisory board.147 At least 
one-third of a corporation’s supervisory board members must be 
employee representatives.148  
Commercial banks typically own the majority of stock held in 
AG.149 This phenomenon results from the fact that historically, 
Germans are very risk averse and will not invest in corporations the 
same way Americans do.150 Consequently, German banks play an 
important role as intermediaries. Individuals purchase the majority of 
stocks in a German corporation through one of the large banks in a 
similar fashion to any other product available to depositors.151 As a 
result, in most corporations, the supervisory board generally consists 
of representatives of large German banks acting as executive officers 
of the company. 152 This creates “an interlocking network among 
supervisory boards within Germany.”153 The EC delegates auditing 
responsibilities to the managing board, and many German companies 
must have employees or union representatives on their audit 
committees.154 These practices make it difficult to comply with the 
Act’s independence requirement. Individuals affiliated with the 
company, such as employees or union representatives often sit on the 
managing board, which violates the Act’s Section 301 independence 
requirement. Furthermore, since German banks often own the majority 
of shares in AG’s, any individual associated with such banks, who also 
 
 
146 See Chantayan, supra note 139, at 434. 
147 See Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations: A 
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154 See id. 
WINTER 2006 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 
27 
sits on the audit committee, would violate the independence 
requirement if the bank owns ten percent or more of the AG’s shares. 
Because the inherent structure of many German corporations makes 
compliance with the Act so difficult, the SEC should consider granting 
exemptions for German corporations and other similarly structured 
European companies.  
  
b. French practice. Similar to German corporations, French 
corporations face numerous challenges trying to comply with the Act 
because of inherent corporate structure. French corporations use one of 
two different management structures: a one-tiered board, consisting of 
a board of directors; or a two-tiered board, comprised of an executive 
board and a supervisory board and modeled after the German 
corporate structure.155 Although the single-board-of-directors approach 
is used most often, corporations may use a two-tiered board when one 
group of shareholders agrees that it will not play an active role in the 
corporation’s management, when the corporation is family owned, or 
when the corporation’s management requires more independence from 
the shareholders.156 In a traditional French corporation with a single 
board of directors, the board controls the corporation and participates 
in the corporation’s management.157 In the two-tiered system, there is a 
clear delegation of powers. The executive board manages the 
corporation and the supervisory board controls the actions of the 
executive board without taking part in the corporation’s 
management.158 Also, similar to Germany, France is characterized by a 
“bank-centered capital market and a singularly concentrated ownership 
structure.”159 In French public corporations, known as Societes 
Anonymes (SA), stockholdings have traditionally been relatively 
concentrated among specific families, financial institutions, 
corporations, or the State.160 As a result, directors of different 
corporations are often linked to one another, and members of one 
corporation’s board of directors often sit on other corporations’ 
boards.161  
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Problems with compliance also result in French corporations 
because, except for state-owned corporations, families own or 
dominate more than fifty percent of the largest public corporations in 
France.162 These family-owned corporations combine ownership and 
control, and the board does not play an independent role.163 
Concentration of ownership by institutional investors such as banks, 
insurance companies, and networking corporations comprise the 
remaining group of large corporations.164 French banks, as dominant 
shareholders in French corporations, have considerable power within 
corporations through their membership on boards and through the 
companies’ heavy reliance on debt financing.165 Since the State owns a 
significant share in many public corporations, it traditionally utilizes 
its shareholder vote to place government-related board members on the 
board of directors.166 Consequently, members of the board of directors 
may often be closely related to, or have substantial interest in, the 
corporation. As a result, an individual affiliated with the corporation or 
representing a substantial shareholder will likely sit on an audit 
committee, thereby violating the Act’s Section 301 independence 
requirements.  
Consequently, French companies, as members of the Association 
Francais des Enterprises Privées, Association des Grandes 
Entreprises Francais (AFEP-AGREF) have complained about the 
negative consequences of the compensation and affiliated-person 
prongs of the independence requirement.167 These companies criticized 
the Act as automatically disqualifying directors that may also be 
executive officers of a bank that is a controlling shareholder, in the 
event that the bank receives any fees in connection with transactions in 
the ordinary course of business.168 As to the affiliated-person prong, 
one company stated, “it is not clear to us why a director, otherwise 
independent, should be disqualified from audit committee service if 
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that director also sits on the board of entity [sic] in which the issuer 
holds a substantial interest but less than a majority.”169 
As a result of this majority shareholder influence on the boards of 
directors of European corporations, it is difficult for these corporations 
to comply with the Act’s strict independence requirements. Without an 
exemption, such European corporations may have to undergo 
burdensome costs and forgo traditional European practices in 
restructuring their boards of directors and audit committees.  
 
2. The EC’s Plan 
 
In light of recent European accounting scandals, the Plan includes 
a specific proposal to adopt a short-term recommendation 
(Recommendation), placing special emphasis on audit committee 
standards.170 The EC expressed its intention to address the role of audit 
committees in supervising audits, both in selecting an external auditor 
for appointment by shareholders and monitoring the relationship with 
the external auditor.171 The EC also stated it would address such 
internal aspects as reviewing accounting policies as well as monitoring 
internal audit procedures and the company’s risk management 
system.172  
Acknowledging unique European practices, the EC’s Plan 
provides a flexible approach whereby corporations with varying 
structures may face fewer obstacles to achieve compliance. On 
February 15, 2005, addressing the role of audit committees and related 
board and audit committee independence standards,173 the EC 
recommended that Member States delegate responsibilities to the audit 
committee. Examples of these responsibilities include ensuring the 
accuracy of financial reports and other disseminated information, as 
well as monitoring procedures established for evaluation and 
management of risks.174 As a result, the EC established independence 
requirements because most audit committees are composed of 
members of the board of directors or supervisory board.175 In contrast 
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with the U.S. requirements, the EC’s approach integrates its traditional 
“comply or explain” principle, whereby companies are “invited to 
disclose whether they comply with the code and to explain any 
material departures from it.”176 The EC adopted this approach so that 
companies would be able to comply with sector- and enterprise-
specific requirements that may depart from the EC or national 
independence standards.177 
As to independent directors, the recommendation states that “the 
(supervisory) board should comprise a sufficient number of committed 
non-executive or supervisory directors, who play no role in the 
management of the company or its group and who are independent in 
that they are free of any material conflict of interest.”178 However, “in 
view of the different legal systems existing in Member States,” the EC 
declined to determine what proportion of board members should 
consist of independent directors.179 Nevertheless, the EC should 
organize boards in such a way “that a sufficient number of 
independent non-executive or supervisory directors play an effective 
role in key areas where the potential for conflict of interest is 
particularly high.”180 To this end, the EC should create audit 
committees within the supervisory board or the board of directors.181 
Audit committees should be composed exclusively of non-executive or 
supervisory directors, and at least a majority of members should be 
independent.182 In contrast to the Act’s strict independence rules, the 
Plan defines independence as being “free of any material conflict of 
interest.”183 Furthermore, under the Plan, audit committees should 
assist the board in (1) monitoring the integrity of financial information 
provided by the company, particularly by reviewing the relevance and 
consistency of the accounting methods and the internal control and 
risk systems the company uses; (2) ensuring that major risks are 
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properly identified, managed, and disclosed; and (3) ensuring the 
effectiveness of the internal-audit system.184  
In 2002, the EC adopted a recommendation requiring Member 
States to prohibit statutory auditors from carrying out statutory audits, 
either on their own, or on behalf of an audit firm, if they are not 
independent.185 The recommendation defines independence as not 
having any “financial, business, employment or other relationships 
between the statutory auditor and his client (including certain non-
audit services provided to the audit client) that a reasonable and 
informed third party would conclude compromise the statutory 
auditor's independence.”186 
Member States must ensure that statutory auditors are liable for 
sanctions when they do not perform a statutory audit in an appropriate 
manner.187 Member States must also ensure that members and 
shareholders of an audit firm do not intervene in a statutory audit in a 
manner that jeopardizes the independence of the individuals 
performing the audit.188 Moreover, regarding non-audit services, the 
recommendation limits the type of non-audit services a Statutory 
 
 
184 Id. at Annex 1, art. 4.2. With respect to the external auditor appointed by the 
company, the audit committee, at a minimum, should perform the following functions: 
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191). 
186 Id. at 4. 
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Auditor or Audit Firm may provide to an audit client.189 Much like the 
Act, the recommendation also sets forth examples of prohibited non-
audit services.190  
The foregoing EC recommendations, if adopted by Member 
States, would help bring European auditor and audit committee 
independence provisions more in line with the Act’s independence 
requirements. However, the EC’s proposed independence requirement 
is not as strict as the requirement set forth in the Act. For instance, 
Member States have flexibility in applying these recommendations, 
and their individual independence requirements will likely reflect 
prevailing national corporate practices. The EC’s broad definition of 
independence and its “comply or explain” approach directly contrast 
with the Act’s stringent independence requirements. Therefore, the 
EC’s independence requirements will not likely transform European 
board structure enough to bring it entirely into compliance with the 
Act. A European issuer, which may easily comply with European 
independence requirements, will likely have to undergo significant 
restructuring costs when issuing securities in the U.S. market. 
 
3. The SEC’s exemptions for European issuers 
 
As a result of the differences in European corporate practices, the 
SEC has made limited accommodations to foreign issuers pertaining to 
auditor and audit committee independence.191 The final rules include 
several provisions applicable only to foreign issuers in order to 
“address potential conflicts with foreign legal requirements where 
consistent with fulfilling the investor protection mandate of the 
 
 
189 The company’s “overall safeguarding system” must ensure that those 
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Act.”192 In Final Rule 33-8220, the SEC makes appropriate 
exemptions to address potential conflicts that the independence 
requirement of Section 301 poses with foreign issuers’ corporate 
structures.193   
Acknowledging that Germany’s requirement that employees sit on 
a corporation’s supervisory board would not meet the Act’s 
independence requirement,194 the SEC made a limited exemption from 
the independence requirement for such foreign issuers.195 The final 
rule permits non-executive employees196 to sit on the audit committee 
of a foreign private issuer if the employee is elected or named to that 
issuer’s board of directors in accordance with one of the following: the 
issuer’s governing law or documents, an employee collective 
bargaining agreement, or some other home country legal or listing 
requirement.197 Furthermore, with respect to a two-tiered board 
system, which is prevalent in both Germany and France, the SEC’s 
final rule clarifies that the supervisory board acts as the “board of 
directors” for purposes of implementing the Act.198 Either the 
supervisory board can form a separate audit committee, or the 
supervisory board can serve as the audit committee if the entire 
supervisory board is “independent” (within the meaning of Section 
301 and the final rule).199 As applied to German issuers, employees 
may continue to sit on the supervisory board in accordance with 
German law, provided they are not executive officers.200  
Because of criticism from European companies, the SEC 
recognized that many foreign issuers permit representatives of 
controlling shareholders or groups of shareholders to sit on their audit 
committees.201 In its final rule, the SEC decided that one member of an 
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audit committee can be a representative of an affiliate of a foreign 
private issuer, provided they fulfill the “no compensation prong,”202 
and they are not one of the issuer’s executive officers.203 Further, the 
representatives may only have observer status on the committee and 
may not participate as a voting member or as the chair of the audit 
committee.204 This exemption brings both French and German 
companies with more than one controlling shareholder represented on 
the board or audit committee into compliance with the Act.205  
Because many foreign governments hold significant shares of 
issuing companies, or special shares permitting the government to 
exercise certain rights over the issuer,206 such issuers would fail to 
satisfy the Act’s independence requirement. Therefore, the SEC also 
provided a limited exemption for foreign issuers with government 
representatives sitting on their audit committees.207 Under the final 
rule, an audit committee member can be a representative of a foreign 
government or foreign governmental entity, provided the member does 
not violate the “no compensation prong”208 and is not one of the 
issuer’s executive officers.209 Foreign governments that are also listed 
issuers are exempted entirely from the audit committee requirement of 
the Act.210  
In light of the EC’s recommendations regarding audit committee 
independence requirements, the SEC should consider granting 
additional exemptions on a country-by-country basis. The SEC should 
consider permitting European governments that have implemented the 
EC’s recommendations to provide comprehensive information on their 
own independence requirements in order to determine whether to 
exempt issuers in such countries. Thereafter the SEC should issue 
exemptions based on whether each individual nation’s requirements 
are equivalent to the Act’s independence standards. For example, a 
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nation’s standards would be equivalent if its laws (a) develop an 
independence standard so as to prevent significant shareholders (ten 
percent or more) or affiliated persons from sitting on a company’s 
audit committee, (b) have a similar compensation requirement as the 
United States, and (c) eliminate or restrict the application of a “comply 
or explain” approach. Exempting corporations on a country-by-
country basis under an equivalence approach should adequately 
balance the need to respect differing European corporate norms while 
still protecting American investors and maintaining the integrity of 
U.S. markets. 
  
D. Corporate Governance 
 
Another major set of reforms affecting foreign securities issuers 
relates to corporate responsibility. Corporate governance involves 
protecting shareholders from self-dealing by those in control of a 
corporation.211 This is particularly important in both American and 
European corporations because the ownership of a publicly traded 
corporation is often separate from its control.212 In the Act, corporate 
governance reforms relate particularly to individual director and 
executive officer responsibility. The EC’s Plan, however, focuses on 
implementing rules providing for the collective responsibility of the 
board rather than making specific individuals responsible for a 
corporation’s control.  
  
1. The Act 
 
Provisions of the Act reflect Congress’ belief that individual 
managers should be held responsible for a company’s financial 
representations.213 Under the Act’s separate criminal and civil 
provisions, CFOs and CEOs are now required to personally certify the 
issuer’s annual and quarterly reports.214 Therefore, both the Act and 
accompanying rules require the CEO and CFO to individually certify 
that they have reviewed the reports and that based on their knowledge, 
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the reports do not contain any material misstatements or omissions.215 
The CEO and CFO are also responsible for certifying that (1) they 
established and maintained internal disclosure controls and procedures 
to ensure that material information relating to the company is made 
known to them, (2) they designed internal controls over financial 
reporting to provide reasonable assurance that financial reporting and 
the preparation of financial statements are reliable, (3) they disclosed 
any material change in the company’s internal control over financial 
reporting, and (4) they disclosed to the auditors or audit committee any 
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or 
operation of internal control over financial reporting as well as any 
fraud.216 In addition, if the SEC requires an issuer to prepare an 
accounting restatement due to a material non-compliance caused by 
misconduct, the CEO and CFO must reimburse the issuer for “(1) any 
bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received 
by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following 
the first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first 
occurs) of the financial document embodying such financial reporting 
requirement; and (2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of 
the issuer during that 12-month period.”217 
Requiring CEO and CFO certification for annual and quarterly 
reports runs directly contrary to European practice, in which the board 
of directors or the supervisory board must collectively certify the 
accuracy of the company’s financial statements.218 Furthermore, the 
E.U. does not currently have an internal-control reporting requirement. 
Several European companies have complained about both the CEO-
and-CFO-certification provision and the internal-control reporting 
requirements.219 For example, Porsche, the German car company, 
cancelled plans to issue securities on the New York Stock 
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Exchange,220 stating that it did not agree with the Act’s CEO-and-
CFO-certification requirements.221 By increasing management 
responsibility, the Act may have deterred European companies from 
participating in the U.S. market.  
 
2. The EC’s Plan 
 
In formulating its Plan relating to corporate governance reforms, 
the EC considered each Member State’s unique practices and beliefs 
regarding the roles of corporations and how corporations should be 
financed.222 Consequently, the EC decided that adopting a full 
European corporate governance code would not “achieve full 
information” for investors about corporate governance rules affecting 
companies in various European countries, nor would a code improve 
corporate governance rules in Europe because harmonization would be 
difficult to achieve.223 As part of the EC’s ongoing process to review 
and implement corporate governance reforms, the EC created the 
European Corporate Governance Forum (the Forum) in October 
2004.224 The Forum consists of fifteen senior experts from various 
professional backgrounds whose experience and high level of 
expertise is widely recognized across Europe.225 The Forum should 
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meet two or three times a year and deliver an annual report to the 
EC.226 
A major corporate governance reform elaborated upon in the Plan 
relates to the composition, remuneration and responsibilities of the 
board of directors.227 The EC’s proposal calls for giving E.U.-listed 
companies the option of having either a one-tiered board structure, 
with executive and non-executive directors, or a two-tiered board 
structure, with managing directors and supervisory directors.228 The 
Commission may also permit additional organizational freedom, but 
first wishes to study the implications of doing so.229 The Plan suggests 
that in certain areas where executive directors have clear conflicts of 
interest, such as in audits, these decisions should be made exclusively 
by non-executive or supervisory directors.230  
On February 15, 2005, the EC adopted a set of recommendations 
in which it confirmed the collective responsibility of either the board 
of directors or the supervisory board for a company’s financial 
statements.231 This recommendation does not take the form of a 
legislative act. However, the EC requests that Member States take the 
“necessary measures to promote the application . . . of the principles 
set out in [its] Recommendation” by June 30, 2006, so that the EC may 
closely monitor the situation in Member States and take further action 
if necessary.232  
The Forum “advised unanimously against the imposition of an 
obligation for boards to certify the effectiveness of internal controls at 
the present time.”233 The Forum instead decided that it would study the 
U.S. experience in relation to such certification requirements.234 If it 
adopts an internal-control certification requirement, “it would be 
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necessary to strike the balance between the benefits of additional 
requirements and the potential costs and burdens for companies.”235 In 
the medium term, the EC also intends to examine how it might 
enhance directors’ responsibilities.236 
   
3. The SEC’s exemptions for European issuers 
 
The SEC granted foreign issuers a short-term exemption from 
complying with requirements relating to disclosures of internal control 
over financial reporting. Foreign issuers have until July 15, 2007, to 
become a compliant. The SEC explains that foreign issuers have 
“faced particular challenges in complying with the internal control 
over financial reporting and related requirements, which include 
language, culture, and organization structures that are far different 
from what is typical in the United States.”237  
CEO-and-CFO-certification requirements run directly contrary to 
European practice, wherein the entire board certifies financial 
statements. Imposing full board responsibility for financial statements 
may provide similar corporate governance protection as a CEO-and-
CFO-certification requirement. This similar level of protection is only 
possible if the EC or Member States impose collective liability on 
board members. The Plan is uncertain on whether the EC intends to 
impose collective liability on board members for non-compliance. 
Therefore, the SEC should consider granting exemptions only to 
issuers located in EC Member States wherein the laws provide for full 
 
 
235 Id. 
236 The EC will accomplish this through a) introducing a “special investigation 
right,” which would enable stakeholders holding a certain percentage of shares to have 
the right to ask a court or administrative authority to authorize a special investigation 
into the company’s affairs; b) developing a “wrongful trading rule,” wherein directors 
would be held personally accountable for the consequences of a company’s failure if it 
is foreseeable that a company cannot continue to pay its debts, but the directors do not 
take steps to “rescue” the company and ensure payment or to liquidate the company; 
and c) imposing “director’s disqualification” rules as a sanction for misleading 
financial and non-financial statements and other types of misconduct by directors. See 
Modernizing Company Law, supra note 21, at 16.  
237 Final Rule: Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial 
Reporting and Certification of Disclosure In Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-
Accelerated Filers and Foreign Private Issuers, Release No. 8545 (Mar. 2, 2005). See 
also Final Rule: Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting 
and Certification of Disclosure In Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Companies that 
are not Accelerated Filers, Release No. 33-8618 (Sept. 22, 2005). Foreign private 
issuers that are accelerated filers must begin to comply by July 15, 2006. Id. 
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board responsibility and liability. Doing so would achieve Congress’ 
objective of holding the management of a company fully responsible 
for the corporation’s representations. In such cases, collective 
responsibility may thus render individual CEO-and-CFO-certification 
unnecessary.  
However, CEO-and-CFO-certification regarding the effectiveness 
of internal controls is still required under section 302 of the Act. If 
legislation in individual European countries or by the EC achieves 
board accountability for internal control efficiency, the SEC should 
consider granting exemptions on a case-by-case basis. On the other 
hand, this accountability is unlikely to occur in the near future, as the 
EC plans to study the effects of U.S. internal control certification 
requirements prior to implementing similar legislation. Therefore, until 
the EC imposes similar internal control certification, the SEC should 
not consider granting internal control exemptions to European issuers. 
  
IV. CONCLUSION: WHERE SHOULD THE SEC GO FROM HERE? 
 
While the SEC has made progress in creating limited exemptions 
for foreign corporations, in light of the EC Plan, and the existence of 
fundamental differences between European and American 
corporations, the SEC should consider granting further limited 
exemptions for European companies. The agency should (1) permit 
European issuers to file financial statements with the SEC using only 
IFRS, (2) exempt European issuers from audit committee 
independence requirements if the issuer’s home country independence 
standards are equivalent to those set forth by the SEC, and (3) exempt 
European issuers from CEO-and-CFO-certification requirements if the 
issuer’s home country or if the EC imposes collective liability on 
board members. Finally, the SEC should consider exempting European 
issuers from PCAOB registration and inspection only if the EC’s 
CESR and Committee on Auditing oversight capabilities are 
sufficiently strengthened so as to parallel those of the PCAOB. 
If the EC’s Plan is successfully developed and adopted, the 
principles of the Act may eventually be realized throughout Europe. In 
the long term, the SEC may be able to exempt European companies 
from full compliance as to many of the Act’s provisions and 
accompanying rules. However, the EC’s “comply or explain” position 
directly contradicts the stringent rules imposed by the Act. Therefore, 
in order for the SEC to fully exempt European issuers, the EC would 
have to abolish its “comply or explain” rule. 
As the EC’s Plan calls for three phases of implementation through 
2009, it is yet to be determined whether the Plan will thoroughly 
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achieve the goals of the Act, or even whether individual European 
Member States will adopt the EC’s recommendations. It thus remains 
to be determined how far the SEC should go in the long term to 
exempt European companies from the stringent requirements of the 
Act. In the meantime, granting the foregoing narrow exemptions 
would appropriately take account of the EC’s developing Plan and 
respect the different European corporate practices, while still 
protecting American investors and preserving the integrity of the 
American securities market. 
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